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Abstract: Standard accounts of the ad baculum locate its fallacious either in irrelevance or dialogue shift. Such 
accounts, however, fail to explain its persuasiveness. This paper offers a new account where the real target of an ad 
baculum is an audience downstream from the initial ad baculum exchange. This means that the ad baculum consists 
in misrepresenting the quality of evidence by means of the forced adoption of a particular standpoint. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Suppose you and I are having an argument about whether p. You hold that p; I hold that not-p. 
You adduce a series of arguments, so do I. We get nowhere, but, because I’m persistent, I say: 
“if you continue with this p business I’m going to punch you in the face.” Were I a more subtle 
person, I might have achieved the same result by suggesting that continuing to assert that p might 
occasion the revelation of some embarrassing personal fact about you. My arguments are ad 
baculum—appeals to the force. Commonly, a fallacious ad baculum argument is one where an 
arguer uses a threat to induce someone to draw a particular conclusion irrelevant to threat (Van 
de Vate 1975: 43; Walton 2014: 296). At first pass, it’s somewhat baffling that anyone ever 
thought that the ad baculum was ever, as they say, a thing in argumentation studies. For, it would 
seem to be blindingly obvious even to the least competent of arguers that no amount of force is 
going to make someone believe something. Beliefs, by most plausible accounts, are involuntary 
and do not respond to commands, bribes, or other inducements (Cohen 1992; Woods 1998: 496). 
If that were not bad enough, the threat of force, even if subtle, would seem to call attention to the 
lack of rational grounds for the arguer’s conclusion. Since fallacies are supposed in some sense 
to appear to be stronger arguments than they are, it would be odd that in the case of the ad 
baculum there is no deception. Indeed there cannot be any, because if the threat is going to have 
any force, it needs to be recognized for what it is. 
 Despite this massive plausibility problem, one still finds accounts of the ad baculum in 
popular critical thinking or introduction to logic texts (I’ll discuss one below). This is somewhat 
surprising (but only somewhat), because the comparatively extensive scholarly literature on the 
subject has essentially pronounced it not to be anything like what these texts describe. Naturally, 
I’m speaking generally because I don’t have a lot of space, but even the most ontologically 
generous accounts barely leave it standing (Van de Vate 1975; Brinton 1992; Walton 2000). 
Many deny that the common account is any kind of argumentative scheme at all (or that if it is a 
scheme, there is nothing logically wrong with it) (e.g., Wreen 1989). For Pragma-dialectics, the 
ad baculum breaks a rule of behavior rather than any kind of logical rule (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 2004: 180). More recently Budzynska and Witek (2014) have suggested looking 
beyond the inference-schematic features of the ad baculum to appreciate it as a “complex 
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rhetorical technique” where the ethotic components of the person making the ad baculum 
argument are central to understanding how it works.  
 In this paper, I am going to argue that the ethotic features of the ad baculum arguments 
can explain the most baffling feature about them: how do you get someone to believe something 
by force. The answer I will give, in short, is you don’t get them to believe it, you get them to 
adopt it so that other people believe it. My argument relies on the oft-overlooked distinction (at 
least in argumentation studies) between beliefs and commitments (Paglieri & Castelfranchi 2006; 
Godden 2012 and 2015). You can get someone to adopt a commitment through force because 
you adopt commitments voluntarily. Beliefs, by contrast, are involuntary, and mainly responsive 
to evidence. Since I am arguing that the approach to the ad baculum has been inadequate, I will 
argue my thesis through an analysis of two famous cases of this approach. I’ll follow this with 
some observations and conclusions. 
 
2.  An (in)famous account of the ad baculum. 
 
I want to start with a well-known account of the ad baculum, Hurley and (new this edition) 
Watson’s widely used Concise Introduction to Logic, as of 2016 in its 13th edition. It is 
noteworthy that this text, which has changed little across its many editions, has already been 
subjected to detailed (and scathing) critique in the ad baculum literature.1 I don’t mean to pile on 
or even duplicate that work. I think rather that there is something of value in Hurley and 
Watson’s attempt that the critique has missed.  
 Hurley and Watson begin their discussion of the fallacies of relevance with the 
argumentum ad baculum, or the “appeal to the ‘stick.’” This fallacy, they write,  
 
occurs whenever an arguer presents a conclusion to another person and tells that person 
either implicitly or explicitly that some harm will come to him or her if he or she does not 
accept the conclusion (p.129).2  
 
People familiar with the Hurley and Watson text know that, broadly speaking, it takes an 
informal logic approach to the problem of fallacies, viewing them as commonly deceptive 
argument schemes where the premises do not provide adequate support for the conclusion. This 
means that they focus their analysis on the schematic features of the argument, how the premises 
fail or succeed in supporting the conclusion. This, I think, is part of the reason their account of 
the ad baculum is a mess. In the next section, we will look at an alternative to this.  
 
1Their analysis of the ad baculum is not all that different from what one would normally encounter in general texts 
of this sort. A thorough review of the relevant introduction to logic-type texts would be a waste of time, so let this 
brief survey suffice. Copi and Cohen (1998), the ur-text for this kind of approach to fallacies, says “the appeal to 
force, to cause the acceptance of some conclusion, seems at first sight so obvious a fallacy as to need no discussion 
at all” (get P# in full edition). Baronet’s (2013) definition is virtually identical: “the threat of physical harm, an 
appeal to force, can sometimes cause us to accept a course of action which otherwise would be unacceptable” 
(p.123). He puts the ad baculum in the fallacies of relevance, claiming that the threat is not “objective evidence” for 
the conclusion (p.124). A very recent handbook to fallacies, Bad Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Fallacies in 
Western Philosophy (2018) replicates the same basic form: “An argument that appeals to force or fear attempts to 
make the audience feel fear at the threat or possibility of harm in order to get them to accept a conclusion” (p.98). 
2Interestingly, Wreen (1989) discusses Hurley’s text at length. What’s surprising is that the definition has not 
changed from the 1985 edition. The examples have also barely changed. By contrast, scholars of argumentation, 
e.g., Groarke and Tindale (2012) and Bailin and Battersby (2016), have no account of the ad baculum. 
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 As Hurley and Watson describe the ad baculum, the reasons given for the conclusion are 
an implicit or explicit threat of some harm.3 This brings us back to our key question: how can we 
force or threaten someone into accepting a conclusion? Their answer to this is somewhat 
surprising. First, the examples. 
 
Child to playmate: Sesame Street is the best show on TV, and if you don’t believe me it, 
I’m going to call my big brother over here and he’s going to beat you up.  
 
Lobbyist to senator: Senator Casey, of course you support our bill to reduce inheritance 
taxes. After all, you wouldn’t want the press to find out about all the contributions you 
receive from the Ku Klux Klan. (Emphasis added p.129) 
 
Before adding other comments, it ought to be said that these examples are not implausible. In my 
day, kids used to fight over which kind of food tasted best (or worst in some cases). Kids are not 
all that great at argument, but adults don’t necessarily fair much better. I was once threatened 
(certainly only rhetorically I hope) in an argument over who liberated Italy in World War II. So 
it’s at least plausible that people threaten each other this way. The question, however, is what 
they want to achieve. One can see that there is something of a confusion here as to whether one 
forces another to believe or to accept or, as in the last case, merely to do something. The 
conclusion of the second example is, or at least seems to be, an action: Senator Casey (no 
relation) is meant to do something by expressing support for some bill—probably voting or 
speaking in favor of it in the Senate chamber. The conclusion of the first example is that the 
playmate ought to believe something. These are certainly different things. They’re also different 
from accepting something, which was mentioned in the introduction. I am going to return to this 
below.  
 Now let’s turn to their analysis. They write: 
 
The appeal to force fallacy usually accomplishes its purpose by psychologically impeding 
the reader or listener from acknowledging a missing premise that, if acknowledged, 
would be seen to be false or at least questionable. (p. 129) 
 
This is a puzzling claim. Their general analysis of a fallacy of relevance, of which the ad 
baculum is the first example, is that the premises are psychologically but not logically relevant to 
the conclusion (p.129). In the ad hominem, for instance, the bad character of some arguer is not 
relevant to the non-character dependent arguments they make. We think it is relevant, in other 
words, when it is not. In the case of the ad baculum, however, the appeal to force impedes 
recognition of the questionable premise, rather than seeming or appearing relevant when it isn’t. 
Hurley and Watson, somewhat admirably, hereby offer an attempt to explain why someone 
 
3I should note that much of the literature on the ad baculum has focused on the passive construction—some harm 
will come to him or her—makes this overly broad and so generates many obvious counterexamples. Arguments 
from consequences have the same structure. For instance, one might argue that drinking water from a certain source 
will lead to sickness. The fear of the sickness in this case is the harmful consequence that will be visited upon their 
head. More pointedly, threats in the course of negotiation also have the same structure. For example, “if you do no 
accept our demand that you raise salaries, you will face a strike.” Clearly, in this case, the pressure of the strike is 
the reason offered for accepting the conclusion (the higher wage). These are exactly the same because the threat will 
be enforced by the person doing the threatening, whereas the first case the treat will be realized as a matter of fact: if 
you drink dirty water from the river, nature will enforce the threat and make you sick. 
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would be duped by an ad baculum: they are duped because they’re afraid. If they were not afraid, 
one might imagine, then they would notice how bad the argument is. Fallacies, if they’re going 
to be fallacies, ought to be deceptive. I am going to argue a bit later that the ad baculum is indeed 
deceptive. It’s just not deceptive here. And it’s not even supposed to be. It wouldn’t work if it 
were so. More on that later. Let’s look at the reconstruction:  
 
If my brother forces you to admit that Sesame Street is the best show on TV, then Sesame 
Street is in fact the best show. 
 
If I succeed in threatening you, then you support the bill to reduce inheritance taxes 
(p.130) 
 
The reconstruction, they argue, makes it clear that the premise—which is the force—does not 
imply the conclusion. It’s worth noting that the reconstruction is different in a few important 
ways from the original arguments. The original arguments had two different conclusions. In the 
first case it was the belief that Sesame Street was the best show; in the second, the willingness to 
support the inheritance tax bill.4 The term “support” is notoriously vague in this context. It can 
mean that one merely favors something (I support the new President) or that they will engage in 
certain actions. The ambiguity of the term makes this somewhat maddening. The first version of 
the Sesame Street case has the kid believing that it’s the best show as the conclusion. I think, in 
other words, Hurley and Watson have missed what is interesting about their cases. Part of the 
reason for this is their informal logic approach: the failure needs to be captured in a scheme and 
the scheme is a sorry method for capturing this sort of failure. Another reason they miss what is 
interesting about their cases is that they’re unclear as to whether they mean to explain the why ad 
baculum arguments are persuasive as a psychological matter, or how they fail as a logical matter. 
The very idea of fallacy theory is that these failures match up—something that fails logically 
happens at the same time to succeed psychologically.  
 The main reason, however, is that they didn’t ask themselves what the cases are about. I 
mean, why would someone threaten someone in order that they believe something? That’s 
psychologically impossible (or at least very difficult) and, as argumentative matter, pointless. 
The Sesame Street enforcer, we have to imagine, must know this fact about beliefs and so have 
some other scope in mind. Given the limited nature of the example, it’s hard to see what it might 
be. But one thing that would make sense is that the addressee’s acceptance of the proposition has 
some kind of value. Our interests, after all, in having our conclusions accepted by others is not 
limited to those with whom we directly interact. Argument is a great way to spread the word. 
What is curious about the ad baculum, as the present cases might have shown, is that we can 
convert non reasons (threats) into reasons. This is clearly the case with Senator Casey. There is 
value in his action of supporting something. Another less obvious, but equally valuable outcome 
is the ethotic character of his supporting something. In other words, the fact that the esteemed 
Senator Casey deems some bill worthy of his support is a fact an onlooker might take into 
 
4For what it’s worth—and this has been noted by Wreen neither of these so reconstructed are arguments, at least 
according to the criteria laid out by Hurley and Watson—they’re conditional propositions. The second argument, 
moreover, such as it is, seems perfectly fine. If indeed they succeed in threatening the luckless Senator Casey, then 
he’s going to support the bill. Supporting is an action, again, like voting, or uttering other sentences to the effect the 
bill ought to be passed. It’s worth noting in passing that the first example, by contrast, makes a rather different claim 
from its reconstruction. The idea now is that Sesame Street is in fact the best show, not merely that the poor bullied 
kid must believe that.  
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account when thinking about it. In other words, the mere acceptance of the proposition, which 
the Senator is able to do under compulsion, has potential epistemic value for someone else. The 
same could be said of the Sesame Street case, even though it’s harder to imagine who the 
audience might be. Perhaps the addressee’s supporting the superiority of Sesame Street has some 
significance to playground fence-riders or Sesame Street skeptics. Knowing (or rather believing) 
that the addressee is a supporter might make the difference in their reasoning. They, after all, 
won’t know about the forced nature of the commitment, so it will seem to them like plausible 
ethotic evidence. Whatever the case, the scheme framework employed by Hurley and Watson 
make this kind of analysis very difficult.  
 
3. Dialogue Shifting 
 
It’s seems obviously true that there exist cases where someone tries to force another to adopt a 
standpoint. It seems also plausible to say that one reason they do this is to achieve some 
argumentative purpose. I propose that this argumentative purpose is to make their view more 
acceptable in the minds of another audience. But, as we’ve seen, it is difficult to see this in a 
schematic account such as the one offered by Hurley and Watson. In order to see this, we have to 
have a view to the purposes of exchanging reasons. For this reason, Walton and Krabbe’s 
concept of dialogue shift offers, I think, an interesting way to represent what is going on 
dialectically with the ad baculum. Since dialogues are normative models for conversation, i.e., 
for how conversations ought to go as defined by their purposes, errors will occur when 
participants illegitimately (i.e., without permission or warning) shift from one kind of dialogue to 
another. Walton and Krabbe envision dialogue shifting as a model for characterizing informal 
fallacies (1995: 2). One answer to this question is that there has been a dialectical shift that has 
gone unnoticed by the participants (1995: 114-115). The second factor leverages the shifting 
context to explain the success of the fallacy deployment. Because fallacious moves are 
sometimes legitimate, an interlocutor may be duped into taking them to be valid. Critically, in its 
fallacious use, the shift is covert, unilateral, or not agreed upon. The heart of the deception, on 
this new account, is to shift the context of the argument in a way that the interlocutor doesn’t 
notice. This feature—the deception feature—which is a central part of the traditional account, 
retains its place in this dialogical account. The interesting thing about the ad baculum, I shall 
argue here, involves the blending and confusion of dialogue purposes over time and space. So, 
roughly: A and B have one kind of dialogue, then B and C have another on the basis of the 
original dialogue. 
 An enlightening comparison case to the ad baculum is what Walton and Krabbe call the 
“Fallacy of Bargaining.” This happens when one attempts “to replace an offer for an argument” 
(1995 p. 104). In a very general sense, the fallacy of bargaining occurs when a critical discussion 
illicitly slips into a negotiation. Given a dialogical approach to fallacies such as that of Walton 
and Krabbe, the most direct way for this to occur is when one participant in a critical discussion 
demands of the other that they meet half-way, or compromise, on some standpoint. Consider the 
following example:  
 
Brava: We’re not getting anywhere by arguing like this and it’s impossible that both of us 
are right. Since I argue the cause of the war was states’ rights and you slavery, why don’t 
we compromise and say it was partly states’ rights and partly slavery? 
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Brava’s offer to split the difference constitutes a dialogue shift. Her approach misunderstands or 
twists the purpose of a critical discussion, where the aim of each participant is to persuade the 
other of the truth or correctness of their position. The aim of the negotiation, in contrast, is to 
make a deal, and making concessions such as these is critical to that. Brava’s move wouldn’t be 
out of place in a negotiation over the price of something, for example. So this seems like a clear 
instance in which an argument is suitable in one context but not in another.   
 While dialogue shifts by participants of dialogues within dialogues are certainly common, 
as we have seen, they are easily detectable by minimally competent participants. Consider again 
Brava’s attempt to shift the dialogue to negotiation. If Abela has any sense, she will notice the 
attempt “to trade an offer for an argument.” Such shifts are indeed comically obvious. Imagine a 
case where an atheist is in a disagreement over the number of gods with an Olympian polytheist; 
they can hardly split the difference at 6 gods.5 Let’s see how this might work in the case of an ad 
baculum. Take the following for example between Frank Forthright, chief of compliance 
department at the Globex Corporation and Assistant Divisional Chief, Mr. Malafide.  
 
Forthright: Mr. Malafide, I’d like to show you some of my lab results. As you can see 
from the chart, there is a high presence of estradiol—known to cause deformities in 
frogs—in our plant’s waste water discharge. I have concluded that we are to blame for 
the recent deformities discovered in the frog population. 
 
Mr. Malafide: I don’t agree with your reasoning, Frank. Left out of your analysis are the 
deep cuts we will have to make to this department if we have to comply with the law. 
Further, you’re not considering the financial hardship your family will face should this 
information get leaked to the public. 
 
Malafide’s attempted ad baculum is, like all ad baculums of this sort, a strategy to change what 
ought to be an epistemic question about the cause of frog deformity into a practical discussion of 
Forthright’s future at Globex Corporation. What is crucial is that the success of this strategy 
relies on Forthright’s recognition of the changing context. If he didn’t notice the shift, a clueless 
Forthright might puzzle over how Malafide means to offer a meaningful objection and fail to see 
that Malafide means to coerce him to take a particular course of action. Far from being an 
unannounced shift in dialogue with the intent to fool its victim into taking the bait, the ad 
baculum is patently obvious shift in dialogue. 
 Another feature of the exchange that reveals the obviousness of the offer-for-an-argument 
ploy is the actual target of the offer. As we have discussed above, central to the conception of 
dialogue at issue here is the concept of commitment. Dialogues concern commitments or 
standpoints of the participants. Commitments are not psychological entities and are freely 
adopted and abandoned, though they have logical properties (Hamblin 1970: 264; see also 
Walton & Krabbe 1995: 21). Commitments are central to the concept of a dialogue theory in part 
for this very reason. You can move them like pieces in a game. Crucially, you can adopt 
commitments that you do not believe. In other words, the notion that commitments can be traded 
freely in an argument is a feature, not a bug, of dialogue theory. 
 By contrast, no party to a dialogue about beliefs is able to negotiate them because beliefs 
are involuntarily held. While it is true that beliefs can be occasioned by deviant causal chains, 
where they are brought about indirectly, in general beliefs track reasons or at least the 
 
5This is Scott Aikin’s joke. 
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appearance of reasons. In trading an offer for an argument one is not tracking reasons and this is 
plainly obvious. Mr. Malafide knows that Forthright isn’t going to change his mind. It doesn’t 
matter anyway, because all Mr. Malafide needs is for Forthright to change his public 
commitments. This would mean that Forthright ceases to claim that the frogs have been poisoned 
by Globex and, among other things, to stop using this claim as a premise in other reasoning 
(Cohen 1992: 4).6 The upshot of this is that while Malafide cannot directly cause Forthright to 
change his belief with an inducement or threat, he can more directly control the beliefs of others 
further down the conversational chain. In the present case, it’s likely that people who become 
aware of Globex corporation’s malfeasance will respond accordingly. But if Malafide deprives 
of them of the opportunity to respond to the evidence, then he has effectively controlled their 
beliefs. In effect, Malafide’s ad baculum is not directed at Forthright so much as it is at other 
potential participants in their extended dialogue. It is directed at them by excluding them. 
Crucially, they are not observers or witnesses, as the ad baculum would then prove equally 
ineffective. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I’ve approached what I take to be an underappreciated problem with the ad baculum 
fallacy, namely the fact that you cannot force an interlocutor to believe something. The existence 
of ad baculum cases, however, cries out for some kind of explanation. I’ve argued that the ad 
baculum stratagem (maybe we should call it a gambit) should be understood in light of its 
broader dialogical purposes. This means that the ad baculum actually involves three parties: the 
two just mentioned and the audience of (B), the respondent. While the respondent can never take 
force as inducements to believe p, they can take them as reasons to commit to p. Their 
commitment to p may then seen by their audience as evidence for p—the fact that Joe Schmo 
supports the bill is good reason to think that the bill is a good one.  
 A second consequence is that force, threat, sanction is not the operative feature in this 
scheme. This three-party scheme works just as well with bribery or arguments ad carotam (as 
Bermejo-Luque 2008 has suggested). The key fact this that someone can voluntarily trade their 
commitment to some proposition to avoid harm (in the case of the ad baculum) or for some gain 
(in the case of the ad carotam). This is why Walton and Krabbe assimilated ad baculum 
arguments to “the fallacy of trading an offer for an argument.” The trick of the ad baculum 
gambit (after all it could backfire) is to convert a negotiated or purchased commitment into 
evidence. 
 The expanded conception of the ad baculum has another consequence. Most accounts of 
the ad baculum focus on the irrelevance of the threat of force to the truth or acceptability of some 
claim. This is certainly true, but the broader goal of the ad baculum is to misrepresent the 
dialectical state of play. It means to give the impression that a certain standpoint has more (or 
fewer) true adherents than it actually does. A broader view of the ad baculum, if anything, shows 
that the inadequacy of the two approaches we have discussed to represent it. As Wreen’s many 
detailed analyses of ad baculum argument have shown, if you consider the ad baculum as an 
argument scheme, you will never capture what is attractive about it. It will always turn up as a 
 
6This passage captures the distinction between beliefs and commitments succinctly: “To accept the proposition or 
rule of inference that p is to treat it as given that p. More precisely, to accept that p is to have or adopt a policy of 
deeming, positing, or postulating that p—i.e., of including that proposition or rule among ones premises for deciding 
what to do or think in a particular context, whether or not one feels it to be true that p.” (4; emphasis added). 
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perfectly reasonable means-end piece of reasoning. Walton’s dialogue approach fairs no better at 
capturing it, because the real target of the ad baculum is not, indeed, cannot be there.  
 If I’ve made any worthwhile points here, and I have my doubts, it’s that sometimes the 
approach to argument analysis in informal logic suffers from what we might call methodological 
individualism. Even dialogue theory, with its deeper reach into the structure and purpose of 
persuasive communication, stops its analysis at the end of individual argument encounters. 
Argumentative exchanges are not necessarily exhausted when the addressee has received the 
message. To explain the effect of the ad baculum, it would have to construct a new encounter 
where the defect is the insincere commitment—the ad hominem does just this. But that doesn’t 
do justice to the strategy of the one who employs the ad baculum. I think our arguments are 
fundamentally meant to outlive our encounters. And I don’t think, this is unique to the ad 
baculum. Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse have made a similar case with regard to other fallacies 
(such as the ad hominem), arguing that even the dialectical model, itself an expansion, 
incompletely represents the dialectical situation (2019: 181). With the straw man, for example, 
the purpose is to misrepresent the quality of an addressee’s argument to an onlooking audience. 
In contrast to the ad baculum, however, it is most effective when the addressee is absent and so 
not able to defend themselves. For the ad baculum, a critical part of the strategy, however, is that 
the target audience isn’t there.   
 
Acknowledgements: Many thanks to Carlos Degollado whose insightful comments as a student 
in Philosophy 101 led to this paper. 
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